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Target  Zones and the 
Management  of the Dollar 
BY  March  1986  the dollar  had  fallen  about  25 percent  from  its peak level 
in February  1985.1  According  to the model  of Stephen  Marris,  perpetua- 
tion of the rates  prevailing  last March  would  leave the U.S. trade  deficit 
well above $100  billion  until 1989,  when it would start  to increase  again.2 
A further decline in the dollar will thus be necessary to produce a 
sustainable  current  account. My own estimate  is that  the dollar  must  fall 
another 10 percent or so to reach what I term "fundamental  equilib- 
rium."3 
While  it is important  that  the dollar  complete  its realignment,  it is also 
important  that it avoid overshooting,  for too low a value would renew 
inflationary  pressure in the United States and increase pressures on 
employment  and the tradable  goods industries  in other industrial  coun- 
tries.  In  my  view the  way to pursue  the  goal  of completing  the realignment 
while avoiding  overshooting  is by prompt  introduction  of a system of 
target  zones for the major  currencies.  In the first section of this paper  I 
outline  such a system. In the second section I describe  eight  factors that 
lead me to favor this approach. In the final section I examine the 
relevance of prospects for the U.S. fiscal deficit to the advisability  of 
adopting  a target  zone approach  to currency  management. 
The author  acknowledges  helpful  comments  of C. Fred  Bergsten  and  Randall  Henning. 
1. Measured  according  to the International  Monetary  Fund's Multilateral  Exchange 
Rate  Model  (MERM)  index. 
2.  Stephen Marris, Deficits and the Dollar: The World  Economy at Risk (Washington, 
D.C.: Institute  for International  Economics, 1985),  chap.  4. 
3. John Williamson,  The Exchange Rate System (Washington,  D.C.: Institute  for 
International  Economics, 1985).  See note 5 for a definition  of fundamental  equilibrium. 
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A Target Zone Proposal 
I favor a limited  number  of the major  countries4  negotiating  a set of 
mutually consistent targets for their effective exchange rates. These 
targets should be selected by estimating the real exchange rate that 
would secure basic balance in the medium term while maintaining 
economic activity at the highest level consistent with the control of 
inflation.5  The  nominal  exchange  rate  targets  corresponding  to the agreed 
real targets should be regularly  updated in the light of new data on 
differential  inflation  rates between countries.  The real targets  should  be 
revised  to accommodate  both secular  trends  such as superior  productiv- 
ity growth  in the tradable  sector6  and  real shocks or new information. 
Exchange  rates should  be permitted  to move within  a zone some 10 
percent  above and  below the target.  A country  participating  in the target 
zone system would  not have an absolute  obligation  to keep its exchange 
rate within  the target  zone, but as the rate approached  or breached  the 
limits of the target zone, the country would be obliged to consult its 
partners.  If only one currency  were to threaten  to break  out of its target 
zone, the presumption  would be that, unless there were reasons for 
revising the target zone, the country that issued that currency should 
amend  its policies with a view to pushing  its rate  back  toward  the middle 
of its target  zone. The principal  instrument  to be used for that purpose 
should  be monetary  policy, reinforced  by exchange rate intervention.7 
4.  The minimum  number  of countries  that would be needed to create a meaningful 
system  would  be the three  majors,  the United  States,  Japan,  and  Germany.  I would  prefer 
it to cover the SDR five (adding  the United Kingdom  and France)  or the summit  seven 
(adding  Italy and  Canada).  Conceivably  members  of the exchange  rate  mechanism  of the 
European Monetary System might enter collectively. The managing  director of the 
International  Monetary Fund should be present at the negotiations  to represent the 
interests  of the smaller  countries. 
5. In The  Exchange  Rate System,  I refer  to basic  balance  as a current  account  outcome 
equal  to the "underlying  capital  flow over the cycle" and also discuss the concept of the 
underlying  capital flow. The exchange rate that satisfies the criterion in the text is 
subsequently  described  as the "fundamental  equilibrium"  rate. 
6. Bela Balassa, "The  Purchasing  Power  Parity  Doctrine:  A Reappraisal,"  Jolurnal of 
Political Economy,  vol. 72 (December  1964), pp. 584-96. 
7. If interest  equalization  taxes were administratively  feasible,  they would  provide  an 
attractive  additional  instrument,  but  they seem to be ruled  out as impractical. John Williamson  167 
If the implied monetary action were to threaten internal balance, it 
should  be complemented  by fiscal action. 
If more than one currency  were to threaten  to breach  its target  zone 
simultaneously,  and the target  zones appeared  to remain  appropriate,  it 
would  become necessary  to decide which  of the issuing  countries  should 
change  its exchange  rate. Several solutions  are conceivable: 
-a  rule  whereby  the strong-currency  countries  would  act if aggregate 
monetary  expansion were below a predetermined  target rate, and the 
weak-currency  countries would act in the converse case-sometimes 
known  as a McKinnon-type  rule;8 
-a  commodity-type  standard  whereby  the strong-currency  countries 
would act if the price of a basket of primary  commodities  were falling, 
and  the weak-currency  countries  would act in the converse case; 
-a  regime of discretion, whereby the strong-currency  countries 
would act if the participating  countries  judged that deflation  posed a 
more serious global threat  than inflation,  and the weak-currency  coun- 
tries would act in the converse case; 
-arule  of automatic  sharing,  wherebyall  countries  would  be  expected 
to act in proportion  to the deviation  of their  rates  from  the targets.9 
My own inclination  is to doubt  whether  it is possible to do better  than 
use discretion, but the question of whether at least a presumptive  rule 
on one of the other three principles might be worthwhile deserves 
investigation. 
A related  question  is whether  exchange  rate  management  needs to be 
supplemented  by international  coordination  of other policies. It would 
be foolish to try to coordinate  so many  policies as to overdetermine  the 
system, but an attempt  at international  coordination  of either growth, 
unemployment,  or fiscal  policy might  be worthwhile.  Such coordination 
may  not  achieve  much,  however, since Keynes and  White  were  probably 
correct in their  judgment that national interests would coincide with 
8.  Ronald I. McKinnon, An International Standardfor Monetaty Stabilization (Wash- 
ington,  D.C.: Institute  for International  Economics, 1984). 
9. In applying  this  rule  one might  wish to normalize  the deviation  of the exchange  rate 
from  its fundamental  equilibrium  for country  size. This  would  require  that  the percentage 
deviation  be divided  by (1 -  a i),  where  ci is the  weight  of the  ith  country  in  the  determination 
of effective exchange  rates. A similar  procedure  is followed to construct  the European 
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world interests once the possibility of beggar-my-neighbor  exchange 
rate  policies was excluded;  but I retain  an open mind. 
Supporting  Judgments 
At the Claremont  Monetary Conference on March 24-25,  1986, I 
listened to the debate with a view to identifying  judgments that lead 
me to differ with some other economists in favoring a target zone 
approach.  The list I compiled  involves the following  eight  propositions. 
-Changes  in the nominal  exchange  rate  have a major  and systematic 
impact  on the real exchange rate, even in the medium  run. The Law of 
One Price has probably  been more thoroughly  discredited  by empirical 
evidence than  any other  proposition  in the history  of economics.  10 
-Exchange  rate misalignments  impose major  costs on the economy. 
Misalignments  have generated  inflationary  pressures in countries with 
undervalued  currencies, have crippled the tradable  goods sectors of 
countries  with overvalued  currencies,  and came close to destroying  the 
liberal  trading  system last year. 
-Asset-market models  do not explain  the behavior  of exchange  rates. 
Operators  in the foreign exchange market take a short-term  view of 
things. The market  by itself cannot be relied on to place the exchange 
rate  at  the  rational  expectations  equilibrium  of the  asset-market  approach 
(the long-run  equilibrium  rate  discounted  by the compounded  long-term 
interest differential)."1  If it is important  to prevent the exchange rate 
from  deviating  from  that  level (at  least on the side away  from  fundamental 
equilibrium),  policy must be in part deliberately  devoted to that end. 
Governments  cannot hope to estimate either the current  equilibrium12 
10. See, for example,  Irving  B. Kravis  and  Robert  E. Lipsey, "Price  Behavior  in the 
Light  of Balance  of Payments  Theories,"  Journal of International Economics,  vol. 8 (May 
1978),  pp. 193-246;  and Peter Isard, "How Far Can We Push the 'Law of One Price'?" 
American Economic Review, vol. 67 (December  1977),  pp. 942-48. 
11. James  M. Boughton,  "Exchange  Rate Movements  and Adjustment  in Financial 
Markets:  Quarterly  Estimates  for  Major  Currencies,"  IMF Staff Papers,  vol. 31 (Septem- 
ber 1984),  pp. 445-68; Paul R. Krugman,  "Is the Strong  Dollar  Sustainable?"  Working 
Paper  1644  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  June 1985);  Jeffrey  A. Frankel  and 
Kenneth  Froot,  The Dollar as an Irrational Speculative Bubble:A  Tale of Fundamentalists 
and Chartists (forthcoming). 
12. The term  "current  equilibrium"  is intended  to connote  the rate  that  would  obtain 
if markets  had  full  knowledge  of all  relevant  facts and  reacted  rationally  to that  knowledge, 
that  is, the rate  that  current  conventional  theory  predicts  will in fact hold. John Williamson  169 
or the fundamental  equilibrium  accurately,  but they are far more likely 
to get an answer  that is approximately  correct  if they pose the question 
directly rather than accept the market's answer while wringing  their 
hands  and  declaring  total abstinence  from  intervention,  as they did  from 
1981  to mid-1985. 
-Medium-run exchange  rate targets  do not involve serious conflicts 
of national  interest. Although  beggar-my-neighbor  incentives for com- 
petitive appreciation  (to control inflation)  or depreciation  (to stimulate 
demand)  can  prevail,  depending  upon  the state  of the world  conjuncture, 
there is less reason  to expect similar  conflicts  in a medium-run  context. 
In particular,  anti-inflation  benefits are bought  at the cost of a deterio- 
ration  in the foreign  balance and are thus inherently  transitory."3  Mer- 
cantilist  desires  for  trade  surpluses  have  traditionally  given  rise  to greater 
concern, but most of us believe that such desires are irrational  rather 
than a true reflection  of national  interests, so that negotiation,  while it 
may prove tedious, should  be capable  of achieving  ultimate  agreement. 
-Fiscal  policy is not necessarily independent  of the exchange rate 
regime. The proposals  outlined  above envisage a fiscal policy directed 
to internal  balance, given the monetary  policy needed to manage  the 
exchange  rate. In practice  one may not expect or even wish for frequent 
"fine-tuning,"  but the world economy will not function satisfactorily 
unless fiscal policy is broadly consistent with the agreed levels  of 
competitiveness. 
No one would claim that merely setting  exchange rate targets  will in 
itself ensure that the political  process will deliver  the responsible  fiscal 
policies that have been conspicuously absent in recent years. But an 
international  commitment  to target  exchange rates should  be helpful  in 
changing  fiscal policy for two reasons. First, only a totally hypocritical 
government  would sign an agreement  to establish  target  zones unless it 
were prepared  to modify  its policies to push  exchange  rates  toward  those 
zones. Admittedly  a successor government  might not regard  itself as 
constrained  by such an agreement  (although  all reports  indicate  that the 
Mitterrand  government  was much  influenced  by its European  Monetary 
System obligations in changing course in 1982-83), but international 
obligations  should become increasingly  difficult  to ignore over time as 
13. Willem  E. Buiter  and  Marcus  Miller,  "The Thatcher  Experiment:  The First  Two 
Years," BPEA, 2:1981, pp. 315-67. 170  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
they become an accepted  part  of the international  system. The General 
Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  does not always prevent  governments 
from surrendering  to protectionist  pressures, but it helps. Second, the 
U.S.  Congress has now learned that fiscal indiscipline can produce 
politically  painful  consequences for the tradable  goods industries, not 
just for "our grandchildren."  As a consequence, a quasi crisis as the 
dollar  threatened  to break  out of its target  zone could  provide  an  occasion 
to muster  the political  consensus needed to take fiscal  action. 
-Economic  policy does not need a "nominal  anchor."  Wicksell  was 
not exactly an inflationist,  but he believed that price stability  should  be 
secured  by placing  frictions  on changes in the price  level, rather  than  by 
anchoring  the price level through  exogenous specification  of some key 
nominal  variable.  I share  his position (except that I would prefer  to use 
demand  management  and  incomes policies rather  than  just interest  rate 
policy to resist changes in the price level), and therefore regard  it as 
unnecessary  to have each country  (or even one country)  either target  a 
monetary  aggregate  or peg the price of a commodity  like gold. This is 
not to say that central banks should be prohibited  from targeting  a 
monetary  aggregate:  a target  zone system will provide  ample  flexibility 
to accommodate  the sort of monetary  targeting  practiced  by Germany 
since 1974,  in which the targets  have been modified  when necessary to 
limit  misalignments. 
-Target  zones cannot force a stability-minded  country to import 
inflation. If one country alone starts to  expand its money supply 
excessively, it will be the one to breach  its target  zone and  be expected 
to amend  its policies. If half the countries  in a target  zone system start 
to inflate, both sets of countries are likely to reach the limits of their 
target  zones at the same  time, and  the inflating  countries  will be the ones 
called to order  unless the world  manages  to forget  all the painful  lessons 
of the 1970s.  Only if a weighted  majority  of the countries  in the system 
resort to renewed inflationary  finance  simultaneously  could a stability- 
minded  country  find  itself alone at the edge of the band. But even in this 
worst-case scenario the country could still fulfill its obligations  to the 
target zone system, without threatening  its own price stability, by a 
measured  monetary  expansion  accompanied  by fiscal  contraction  if that 
proved  necessary  despite  the 10  percent  real  appreciation.  And as prices 
started  to rise in the other  countries,  the stability-minded  country  would 
experience a continuing  nominal  appreciation  that would prevent any 
intensification  of the pressure  to import  inflation. John Williamson  171 
-Speculative  "testing" of the limits  of properly  chosen target  zones 
will fail. Under the Bretton Woods system, fixed exchange rates that 
were initially  appropriate  became misaligned  over time through  differ- 
ential  inflation  or real shocks that  were not compensated  by adjustment 
of the nominal  exchange rate. Participating  nations were reluctant  to 
change pegged exchange rates, and speculators  could see when a rate 
had become inappropriate.  Since the cost of defending  that rate indefi- 
nitely would have been prohibitive,  a speculative attack could lead a 
government  to recognize  that  its self-interest  demanded  a parity  adjust- 
ment.  Resistance  to adjustment  simply  meant  that  the volume  of adverse 
speculation  would increase and the income transfer  to the speculators 
would  be larger,  though  delayed. 
Matters  will be entirely  different  if governments  defend target  zones 
that encompass the equilibrium  rate by policies, such as interest rate 
changes, that increase the cost of adverse speculation. Resistance to 
a speculative  attack on the lower margin  will not result  in a cumulative 
loss of reserves through  the basic balance that must ultimately  under- 
mine the capacity to avoid devaluation, but in a cumulative gain in 
reserves that will make clear to the speculators that their attack was 
misguided and that they would be well advised to cut their losses. 
Even if the speculators push the rate temporarily  outside the zone, 
they will not be able to reap collective profits, since there will be no 
one to whom they can sell out except other speculators. As long as 
the rate stays outside the zone, the authorities  can make  it increasingly 
costly to maintain  the speculative position by raising  interest rates. A 
speculative attack can thus succeed only if a government loses  its 
nerve and devalues when it should not or if it tries to defend a zone 
that does  not  encompass the fundamental equilibrium rate.  Both 
possibilities can be avoided by sticking to the criteria for selecting 
target  zones outlined  above. As speculators  come to realize the futility 
of attacking  target  zones, the zones will become a focus for stabilizing 
speculation, not targets to  test.  That is  why the zones  should be 
published. 
The Dollar and the U.S. Fiscal Deficit 
The target  zone system  would  be advisable  under  almost  any scenario 
involving  the U.S. budget  deficit. If the deficit  falls to zero over the next 172  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
five years, as programmed  under  the Balanced  Budget  and Emergency 
Deficit Control  Act of 1985, more familiar  as "Gramm-Rudman,"  the 
dollar  will stay comfortably  within  its target  zone as long as the Federal 
Reserve Board  is willing  to orient  monetary  policy to the exchange  rate 
objective and to use sterilized  intervention  when necessary. The main 
evidence I would  cite on behalf  of this contention  is the degree  of stability 
of the exchange  rate of the Swiss franc  and the deutsche mark  over the 
past few  years since the Swiss authorities started to  modify their 
monetary  target  with  a view to stabilizing  the rate  against  the mark.  This 
stability is evident in figure 1, in which a higher value represents an 
appreciation  of the mark. 
Without  some commitment  to targeting  the exchange rate, I see no 
reason to expect the dollar  to stay close to its fundamental  equilibrium 
even if the fiscal deficit is brought  promptly  under control. There are, 
after  all, countries  that have pursued  convergent  (and  cautious)  policies 
for the past decade, notably Germany and Japan. Yet the real yen- 
deutsche mark rate has gyrated much more than 10 percent margins 
would have permitted,  for reasons that cannot  be explained  by "funda- 
mentals," meaning  the determinants  of current  equilibrium  exchange 
rates. The instability  of the yen-mark  rate  is contrasted  with  the stability 
of the Swiss franc-mark  rate  in  figure  1. "Stable  policies" are  a necessary 
but not a sufficient  condition  for stable exchange rates; the additional 
requirement  is that  exchange  rate  targets  be a significant  determinant  of 
policy. And since inconsistent  exchange  rate  targets  would  be a disaster, 
an agreement  along  the lines of the target  zone approach  is indispensable 
for exchange  rate stability  and  the limitation  of misalignments. 
Several outcomes are conceivable if the effort to restore U.S. fiscal 
probity  fails. 
In the first  case, the exchange  rate  remains  where it is or falls a little, 
the expansion in net exports generates  a rise in output, and the budget 
deficit  declines endogenously  (and  private saving increases) as a result 
of the rise in income. Deregulation  and the fall in unionization  have 
produced  a fortuitous  but as-yet undetected  decline in the natural  rate 
of unemployment,  inflation  does not resume,  and  we all  live happily  ever 
after. 
The second scenario is the same as the first, except that the natural 
rate has not fallen. Inflation  resumes, and the Federal  Reserve tightens 
monetary  policy. The rise in interest  rates  pushes the dollar  to the top of John Williamson  173 
Figure 1.  Bilateral Real Exchange Rates between Germany and Switzerland and 
between Germany and Japan,  1973-85a 
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Source:  Quarterly data from the International Monetary  Fund. 
a.  Computed using relative wholesale  prices. 
the target zone. The resulting quasi crisis induces the political system to 
do the necessary  on the fiscal front, and again we all live happily ever 
after. 
The third case is a repetition of the second, except that the quasi crisis 
does  not  suffice  to  restore  fiscal  discipline.  Then  either  the  Federal 
Reserve monetizes  the deficit, which would presumably lead to the final 
case,  or, a lesser evil, the dollar breaks through its target zone.  MIainte- 
nance of a target zone  even  though the dollar went above  it would at 
least warn the foreign exchange  market that the authorities judged the 174  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1986 
rate too high and would be seeking to reduce it, which should serve to 
avoid a recurrence  of the speculative  bubble  that  took the dollar  into the 
stratosphere  from mid-1984  to September  1985.  It would in my view be 
a great mistake  to view the zone as so rigid  that any instance of a rate 
straying  outside it was treated as an ultimate disaster that prompted 
abandonment  of the system. 
The final case resembles the second, but the Federal Reserve does 
not tighten monetary policy soon enough or sufficiently. Confidence 
erodes and  the dollar  collapses to the bottom  of the target  zone,  14  a quasi 
crisis that could at least be expected to stiffen monetary  policy, and 
might  also be the occasion for fiscal  action. 
A target  zone approach  could worsen the consequences of failure  to 
correct the U.S. fiscal deficit only if it induced  the Federal  Reserve to 
monetize the deficit. Forewarned  is forearmed;  in that unhappy  event 
the soft buffers should be called into play and the rate allowed to rise 
above the target  zone for a time. 
14. The effect of an increased fiscal deficit is both theoretically ambiguous  and 
apparently  of opposite  sign  between  the United  States  and  many  other  countries.  My  belief 
is that  the major  reason  for that  difference  is in fact differing  confidence  as to whether  the 
deficit  will  be monetized  rather  than  the relative  slopes  of the  LM  and  BP curves  that  cause 
the theoretical  ambiguity. 